Thomas
Hobbes: The Nature and Origin of
Tyranny
Leviathan, Part
II, Chapter 19
There be other names of government in the
histories and books of policy; as tyranny
and oligarchy; but they are not the names of other
forms of government, but of the same forms
misliked. For they that are discontented under
monarchy call it tyranny; and they that are
displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so
also, they which find themselves grieved under a
democracy call it anarchy, which signifies want of
government; and yet I think no man believes that
want of government is any new kind of government:
nor by the same reason ought they to believe that
the government is of one kind when they like it,
and another when they mislike it or are oppressed
by the governors.
Leviathan, Part
IV, Chapter 46
From Aristotle's civil philosophy, they have
learned to call all manner of Commonwealths but the
popular (such as was at that time the state of
Athens), tyranny. All kings they called
tyrants; and the aristocracy of the thirty
governors set up there by the Lacedaemonians that
subdued them, the thirty tyrants: as also to call
the condition of the people under the democracy,
liberty. A tyrant originally signified no more,
simply, but a monarch. But when afterwards in most
parts of Greece that kind of government was
abolished, the name began to signify, not only the
thing it did before, but with it the hatred which
the popular states bore towards it: as also the
name of king became odious after the deposing of
the kings in Rome, as being a thing natural to all
men to conceive some great fault to be signified in
any attribute that is given in despite, and to a
great enemy. And when the same men shall be
displeased with those that have the administration
of the democracy, or aristocracy, they are not to
seek for disgraceful names to express their anger
in; but call readily the one anarchy, and the other
oligarchy, or the tyranny of a few. And that
which offendeth the people is no other thing but
that they are governed, not as every one of them
would himself, but as the public representant, be
it one man or an assembly of men, thinks fit; that
is, by an arbitrary government: for which they give
evil names to their superiors, never knowing (till
perhaps a little after a civil war) that without
such arbitrary government, such war must be
perpetual; and that it is men and arms, not words
and promises, that make the force and power of the
laws.
And therefore this is another error of
Aristotle's politics, that in a well-ordered
Commonwealth, not men should govern, but the laws.
What man that has his natural senses, though he can
neither write nor read, does not find himself
governed by them he fears, and believes can kill or
hurt him when he obeyeth not? Or that believes the
law can hurt him; that is, words and paper, without
hands and swords of men? And this is of the number
of pernicious errors: for they induce men, as oft
as they like not their governors, to adhere to
those that call them tyrants, and to think it
lawful to raise war against them: and yet they are
many times cherished from the pulpit, by the
clergy.
There is another error in their civil philosophy
(which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero,
nor any other of the heathen), to extend the power
of the law, which is the rule of actions only, to
the very thoughts and consciences of men, by
examination and inquisition of what they hold,
notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and
actions. By which men are either punished for
answering the truth of their thoughts, or
constrained to answer an untruth for fear of
punishment. It is true that the civil magistrate,
intending to employ a minister in the charge of
teaching, may enquire of him if he be content to
preach such and such doctrines; and, in case of
refusal, may deny him the employment: but to force
him to accuse himself of opinions, when his actions
are not by law forbidden, is against the law of
nature; and especially in them who teach that a man
shall be damned to eternal and extreme torments, if
he die in a false opinion concerning an article of
the Christian faith. For who is there (that knowing
there is so great danger in an error) whom the
natural care of himself compelleth not to hazard
his soul upon his own judgement, rather than that
of any other man that is unconcerned in his
damnation?
Leviathan,
Conclusion
And because the name of tyranny
signifieth nothing more nor less than the name of
sovereignty, be it in one or many men, saving that
they that use the former word are understood to be
angry with them they call tyrants; I think the
toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny
is a toleration of hatred to Commonwealth in
general, and another evil seed, not differing much
from the former. For to the justification of the
cause of a conqueror, the reproach of the cause of
the conquered is for the most part necessary: but
neither of them necessary for the obligation of the
conquered. And thus much I have thought fit to say
upon the review of the first and second part of
this discourse.
Tyranny
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